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One of the great temptations to which moral philosophers since Sidgwick have 
succumbed is the search for a theory of everything – a combinatorial view that 
synthesizes key insights of rival moral theories and explains why their differences 
are really not as deep as they seem. Although Sidgwick famously hoped to do this 
for ethics, in the final pages of the first edition of his Methods of Ethics he worried 
aloud that he had searched in vain for a “hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a 
fundamental contradiction in a vast system of Belief: a contradiction so fundamen-
tal that if it cannot be overcome the whole system must fall to the ground and 
skepticism be triumphant over one chief part of our thought” (The Methods of 
Ethics, First Edition, MacMillan Publishing: London, 1874, p. 472).
Derek Parfit’s long-awaited second book, On What Matters, is seen by Parfit as 
the continuation of a project begun by Sidgwick. It is an ambitious and ingenious 
attempt to show us how the apparently intractable differences between Kantians, 
consequentialists, and contractualists are, contrary to popular thought, surmount-
able, and that these theorists are ultimately “climbing the same mountain on dif-
ferent sides.” The foundation of this endeavor – the base of the mountain, so to 
speak – is the theory of reasons that Parfit develops in the first five chapters of On 
What Matters. Because of its central importance, I shall focus on this part of the 
book, and on his account of normative reasons specifically.
What is a reason for action? In recent work Parfit has echoed Joseph Raz and 
Tim Scanlon in defining reasons as “facts that count in favor of some act” (See 
“Rationality and Reasons” in Exploring Practical Philosophy, Ashgate Press, 2001, 
p. 121). In On What Matters, Parfit says instead that reasons are given by facts, such 
as the fact that an act is pleasant (p. 31). With this analysis, few would disagree. The 
crucial questions are: what kinds of facts provide reasons, and how do they do so? 
Parfit parses theories of practical reasons into two broad classes. According to 
desire-based theories, only facts that are capable of engaging an agent’s motiva-
tions are potential sources of reasons. Thus, for example, if the prospect of spend-
ing your leisure time listening to Elvis Presley leaves you cold, this may be an 
indication that you have no reason to do so. Two examples of this sort of view are 
the instrumental theory of Richard Brandt, and the internalist theory of Bernard 
Williams. Both are versions of what Parfit calls “deliberative” desire-based theories, 
because both ground normative reasons in desires that survive (or would survive) 
informed deliberation.
According to value-based theories, in contrast, practical reasons are provided 
by the objective (or “agent-neutral”) value of some action, object, or outcome 
(p. 45). Joseph Raz and Thomas Nagel are clear proponents of this view. Value-
based theories imply that whether you have a reason to listen to Elvis records, or to 
use them as cocktail coasters, depends on the intrinsic value of the records them-
selves, or on the instrumental value of using them to procure an intrinsically valu-
able outcome (such as pleasure, relaxation, etc.). In defending a value-based 
theory, Parfit answers what kinds of facts provide reasons – those that have or are 
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capable of yielding agent-neutral value. But he fails to answer how the alleged value 
of certain facts provides reasons, and why agent-relative values cannot ground 
reasons.
Parfit’s distinction between desire-based and value-based theories of reasons 
could not be starker. Value-based theories deny that all reasons are provided 
by desires, but they also affirm the radical thesis that no reasons are provided by 
desires (p. 110). Parfit’s value-based theory thus appears to be inconsistent with the 
Present Aim theory (P) – according to which “reasons are provided by our present 
desires or aims” – endorsed by his former self in Reasons and Persons (Oxford 
University Press, 1984). But this appearance is misleading. For what distinguishes 
the Critical version of P that Parfit endorses from other versions is that it implies 
(contra Hume) that some particular desires, and not just sets of desires, are con-
trary to reason, and that other desires are required by reason (that is, it implies that 
we have non-derivative reasons to rid ourselves of some desires and to acquire 
other desires). Since this is the core claim of value-based theories, we can justly 
construe the Critical Present Aim Theory as a value-based rather than an aim-
based theory of reasons, and thereby preserve continuity between the theory of 
reasons first sketched in Reasons and Persons and further developed in On What 
Matters. This is not to say that many will find Parfit’s account of reasons satisfac-
tory. But it does appear to be consistent with his earlier view, and many moral real-
ists will undoubtedly find it appealing.
The same cannot be said of Parfit’s account of the relationship between reasons 
and rationality. According to Parfit, while people’s reasons are provided by facts, 
“what it would be rational for people to do depends on their apparent reasons, 
whether or not these reasons are real” (p. 35). Thus, Parfit thinks an action is ratio-
nal if it is grounded in a belief that we have a reason to perform the action. Although 
it may be rational, on Parfit’s account, for a masochist to sell himself into slavery, 
because he falsely believes slavery will be fun, he could never have a reason to do 
so. Reasons are provided by (value-laden) facts; rationality is relative to beliefs.
There is a curious asymmetry in Parfit’s account of reasons, on the one hand, 
and rationality, on the other. Most of us believe that insofar as practical reasons 
and rationality are normative notions, they are conceptually tied to the delibera-
tive context in which prospective courses of action are assessed. This context is 
characterized by limited time and information, cognitive constraints, and – what is 
most important – the belief and desire sets on the basis of which deliberators 
assess their prospects. But on Parfit’s account, only rationality is tied to delibera-
tion. We are practically rational, he concedes, even if we have false beliefs or eccen-
tric desires, so long as those beliefs and desires play some role in explaining our 
actions, or in the way we justify our actions to ourselves and others. We act in 
accordance with our practical reasons, though, even if the reasons on which we act 
play no role in our deliberation or in the explanation of our actions. This is puz-
zling for a couple of reasons. First, why should normative reasons be exempt from 
the explanatory requirement that we impose on rationality? Second, why should 
we accept an account of normative reasons that ignores the context of delibera-
tion, while insisting that our account of rationality must be closely tied to the 
context of deliberation?
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Parfit might answer the first question by noting that if value-based theories are 
true, reasons for action may be inaccessible to a particular agent, so that attribut-
ing a normative reason to an agent does not necessarily help explain his action. But 
the second question poses a problem for Parfit if, as some suggest, normative rea-
sons are sensitive to the same kinds of facts that determine whether an action is 
rational.
In explaining the relationship between practical reasons and moral principles, 
Parfit says “whether some act is wrong depends on what … we or others would have 
most reason to consent to, agree to, or want to … do. To know what these principles 
and theories imply, we must answer questions about reasons” (p. 149). This com-
ment clearly indicates Parfit’s awareness of the significance of his first five chap-
ters, and it shows why we should carefully examine how the ship is constructed 
before attempting to use it to circumnavigate the moral globe. It also suggests that 
alterations in his theory of reasons will yield very different answers to the weighty 
questions Parfit hopes to answer.
Parfit’s book is much more than a theory of practical reasons; it is a deep and 
illuminating excursion into Kant’s moral theory and an ambitious attempt to unify 
principles that are widely considered incompatible. As an exercise in normative 
theory, On What Matters is exemplary – Parfit’s meticulous analysis of the implica-
tions of Kant’s various formulations of the categorical imperative is analytic phi-
losophy at its best. But many of us might wonder whether the theory of reasons on 
which Parfit rests his substantive conclusions can survive scrutiny.
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